Discussions about elections often revolve around electoral systems—whether a district-based or proportional representation system is preferable. In reality, however, the technical aspects of electoral design are often far more decisive in determining how many seats political parties ultimately win. One such aspect is the delineation of electoral districts. If districts are designed with a small number of seats, smaller parties are unlikely to secure representation, while larger parties stand to benefit. Likewise, different ways of drawing district boundaries can produce significantly different electoral outcomes.
It is therefore not surprising that, in many countries, controversies surrounding electoral laws focus less on the choice of electoral system and more on the design of electoral districts. Political actors understand that the configuration of electoral districts can heavily influence electoral results from the outset.
This book clearly illustrates that reality. It demonstrates how changes to various electoral district variables—permitted under Law No. 12 of 2003—could have produced legislative election results in 2004 that differed substantially from those officially announced by the General Elections Commission (KPU).
The analysis reveals that the KPU’s decisions regarding electoral district boundaries benefited certain political parties while disadvantaging others. Which parties gained seats and which parties lost opportunities as a result of those decisions are examined in detail throughout the book.
This publication offers valuable lessons for political party leaders, election administrators, researchers, and anyone interested in understanding how electoral district design can shape democratic representation and electoral outcomes.
