Although Election Supervisory Committees (Panwas Pemilu) have long been an integral part of Indonesia’s electoral administration, their existence has consistently been questioned from one election to the next. During the New Order era, Panwaslak was often viewed as a rubber-stamp institution that legitimized violations committed by government-backed political parties. During the democratic transition and the 1999 Election, Panwaslu was criticized as a body that merely issued recommendations without real authority or enforcement power. In the 2004 Legislative Election and the 2004 Presidential Election, while many observers appreciated its efforts, the Election Supervisory Committee was still widely perceived as little more than a supplementary institution. Its recommendations were frequently ignored, and many electoral violation cases it handled were never fully resolved by other relevant institutions.
Given these circumstances, why has the Election Supervisory Committee continued to be maintained and even proposed for institutionalization as the General Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu)? Historical experience demonstrates that Indonesia’s 1955 Election was conducted fairly, orderly, and successfully without a dedicated election oversight institution. Likewise, many countries have managed to conduct democratic elections without the support of a specialized election supervisory body.
Would expanding the authority of election supervisors make them more effective, particularly in handling electoral violations? If their powers were strengthened, would this create overlaps or conflicts with other electoral law enforcement institutions? Could a supervisory body established by statute effectively oversee the General Elections Commission (KPU), whose authority is constitutionally recognized? Rather than creating a stronger supervisory institution, would it be more effective to establish new legal mechanisms, such as allowing parties adversely affected by KPU or regional KPU decisions to challenge those decisions through judicial review or administrative courts?
This book seeks to answer these important questions by tracing the origins and historical development of election oversight institutions in Indonesia. Through a comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the 2004 Election Supervisory Committee, the study provides a clearer understanding of the challenges, limitations, and structural constraints faced by election oversight bodies.
The findings suggest that expectations regarding the ability of election supervisory institutions to significantly improve electoral quality should be tempered by an understanding of their institutional limitations. At the same time, the book offers alternative solutions for ensuring accountability and oversight of the KPU and regional election commissions without necessarily creating new institutions or merely expanding the authority of existing ones.
By examining the experiences of the 2004 Election and the subsequent regional elections, this publication contributes to broader discussions on electoral governance, accountability, and institutional design in democratic elections.
