The administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) should, in theory, have been effective. It enjoyed strong legitimacy from direct presidential elections and was supported by a majority coalition in the House of Representatives (DPR). In practice, however, the administration struggled to maximize its performance, resulting in achievements that were generally modest despite maintaining political stability throughout its ten years in office. Some observers attribute this to leadership style. Yet there is another, perhaps more significant, factor: many of the government’s policy proposals were rejected by the DPR, and even when they were approved, they often had to pass through lengthy negotiations and political bargaining. As a result, policy objectives were frequently diluted, while transactional politics created opportunities for corruption.
What occurred at the national level was also evident in local governments, often in an even more severe form. The problem was not merely ineffective governance, but poor governance. One of its defining characteristics was the lack of harmony between regional heads and their deputies, which contributed to administrative dysfunction and corruption. By the end of 2012, as many as 290 regional heads had become suspects, defendants, or convicted individuals in criminal cases, with approximately 85 percent involved in corruption-related offenses. These corruption cases cannot be explained solely by questions of personal morality or character; they also reflect systemic factors that encourage regional leaders to engage in transactional politics.
Why does transactional politics emerge in both national and local government? Why is the national government often unable to effectively coordinate and oversee local administrations? Why have regional heads and local legislative councils (DPRD) struggled to establish effective governance? And most importantly, how can these problems be addressed?
This book examines the design and administration of legislative and executive elections as key determinants of ineffective governance. The proposed solution is not to eliminate elections as a means of selecting public representatives, but rather to redesign the electoral calendar. Specifically, it argues for reorganizing the schedules of legislative elections, presidential elections, and regional elections into two distinct electoral cycles: national elections and local elections. This restructuring of regional election schedules, the book argues, should be incorporated into the Regional Elections Bill (RUU Pilkada).
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