The application of the parliamentary threshold for elections to the House of Representatives (DPR) as a basis for determining representation in provincial and regency/municipal legislatures (DPRD) raises constitutional concerns under Article 27(1) of the 1945 Constitution. Such an approach effectively disregards a portion of voters’ preferences by preventing votes cast for certain parties from being translated into legislative representation.
Based on simulations of the results of the 1999, 2004, and 2009 General Elections, a parliamentary threshold of 2.5 percent of the national vote for DPR elections appears to be an optimal level. Increasing the threshold would have little impact on further simplifying the party system in parliament. Instead, it would primarily increase the number of wasted votes.
A higher number of wasted votes would make election outcomes less proportional, reducing the extent to which legislative representation reflects the distribution of votes cast by the electorate. This is particularly significant given that Article 22E(3) of the 1945 Constitution explicitly mandates the use of a proportional electoral system. Therefore, any increase in the parliamentary threshold should be carefully evaluated in light of its implications for democratic representation and electoral proportionality.
