



# **SISTEM PEMILU DAN POLITIK UANG**

Burhanuddin Muhtadi

Pengajar FISIP UIN Jakarta, Indikator Politik Indonesia &  
Visiting Senior Fellow ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute






# Preferensi terhadap kebijakan ekonomi

## Tingkat Persetujuan

| Pertanyaan  | Pemilih | Politisi |
|---|---------|----------|
| <b>1</b> Pemerintah harus menyediakan lebih banyak bantuan untuk orang miskin, meskipun harus dengan cara menaikkan pajak | 0.65    | 0.38     |
| <b>2</b> Pemerintah harus ikut turun tangan dalam ekonomi untuk menentukan harga gas dan kebutuhan pokok                  | 0.9     | 0.9      |
| <b>3</b> Orang yang kehilangan pekerjaan harus menerima subsidi (bantuan) pengangguran dari pemerintah                    | 0.71    | 0.45     |
| <b>4</b> Pemerintah harus menetapkan upah minimum bagi pekerja Indonesia  | 0.89    | 0.93     |


# Kongruensi Pemilih-Politisi dalam isu Ekonomi



# Persetujuan terhadap Indeks Islam Politik

|   |  | % Sangat/Cukup Setuju |          |
|---|--|-----------------------|----------|
|   | Pertanyaan   | Pemilih               | Politisi |
| 1 | Pemerintah harus memprioritaskan Islam di atas agama-agama lain                                  | 49                    | 38       |
| 2 | Para pemimpin Islam (ulama) harus lebih berpengaruh dalam kehidupan politik                      | 37                    | 47       |
| 3 | Daerah-daerah di Indonesia harus diperbolehkan menerapkan hukum Islam/syariah pada tingkat lokal | 41                    | 32       |
| 4 | Hukum Islam/syariah harus diterapkan di seluruh Indonesia  | 39                    | 10       |
| 5 | Penistaan terhadap Islam harus dihukum lebih berat   | 63                    | 67       |
| 6 | Ketika ikut pemilihan umum, sangat penting untuk memilih pemimpin Muslim                         | 58                    | 60       |
| 7 | Islam harus menjadi satu-satunya agama resmi di Indonesia  | 36                    | 7        |

# Kongruensi ideologis pemilih dan politisi dalam indeks politik Islam



# Iklan Politik USA Vs. Brasil



## PERSONAL VOTES MAKIN MENGUAT

**Table 1.2** Personal votes in national, provincial, and district legislative elections (%): The 2014 legislative election

| <i>How voters to cast the ballot</i>  | <i>DPR election</i> | <i>Provincial DPRD</i> | <i>District DPRD</i> |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|----------------------|
| Party only                            | 27.3                | 23.7                   | 16.8                 |
| Candidate only                        | 44.5                | 47.5                   | 52.1                 |
| Party and candidate from same party   | 22.5                | 21.0                   | 23.1                 |
| Multiple party and multiple candidate | 0.1                 | 0.1                    | 0.1                  |
| Intentionally invalidate/Didn't cast  | 0.1                 | 0.2                    | 0.2                  |
| Refused                               | 1.9                 | 2.7                    | 2.0                  |
| Forgot                                | 3.6                 | 4.7                    | 5.6                  |

Source: LSI post-election national survey conducted in June 2014

# Indonesia Juara Ketiga Politik Uang di Dunia

| COUNTRY                | %         | N            | COUNTRY          | %  | N     | COUNTRY              | %            | N     |
|------------------------|-----------|--------------|------------------|----|-------|----------------------|--------------|-------|
| Uganda 2012            | 41        | 2,400        | Mexico 2010      | 17 | 1,562 | Cote d'Ivoire 2013   | 7            | 1,200 |
| Benin 2012             | 37        | 1,200        | Paraguay 2010    | 16 | 1,502 | Ghana 2012           | 7            | 2,400 |
| <b>Indonesia 2014*</b> | <b>33</b> | <b>1,210</b> | Burundi 2012     | 16 | 1,199 | Malaysia 2013        | 7            | NA    |
| Kenya 2011             | 32        | 2,399        | Colombia 2010    | 15 | 1,506 | Nicaragua 2010       | 6            | 1,540 |
| Liberia 2012           | 28        | 1,199        | Cameroon 2013    | 14 | 1,200 | Botswana 2012        | 6            | 1,200 |
| Swaziland 2013         | 27        | 1,200        | Malawi 2012      | 14 | 2,407 | Cape Verde 2011      | 6            | 1,208 |
| Mali 2012              | 26        | 1,200        | Tanzania 2012    | 14 | 2,400 | Jamaica 2010         | 6            | 1,504 |
| Niger 2013             | 24        | 1,200        | Guatemala 2010   | 14 | 1,504 | South Africa 2011    | 6            | 2,399 |
| Sierra Leone 2012      | 23        | 1,190        | Brazil 2010      | 13 | 2,482 | Guyana 2010          | 6            | 1,540 |
| Dominican Rep 2010     | 22        | 1,500        | Madagascar 2013  | 13 | 1,200 | Uruguay 2010         | 6            | 1,500 |
| Burkina Faso 2012      | 22        | 1,200        | Zambia 2012      | 13 | 1,200 | Chile 2010           | 6            | 1,965 |
| Morocco 2013           | 22        | 1,200        | Peru 2010        | 12 | 1,500 | Trinidad/Tobago 2010 | 5            | 1,503 |
| Philippines 2013       | 22        | 1,200        | Venezuela 2010   | 12 | 1,500 | Mozambique 2012      | 5            | 2,400 |
| Egypt 2013             | 20        | 1,200        | Guinea 2013      | 11 | 1,200 | Honduras 2009        | 4            | 1,005 |
| Nigeria 2012           | 19        | 2,400        | Senegal 2013     | 11 | 1,200 | Algeria 2013         | 3            | 1,206 |
| Zimbabwe 2012          | 19        | 2,400        | El Salvador 2010 | 10 | 1,550 | Lesotho 2012         | 2            | 1,197 |
| Argentina 2010         | 18        | 1,410        | Togo 2012        | 10 | 1,200 | Mauritius 2012       | 1            | 1,200 |
| Panama 2010            | 18        | 1,536        | Costa Rica 2010  | 9  | 1,500 | Tunisia 2013         | 1            | 1,200 |
| Belize 2010            | 17        | 1,504        | Ecuador 2010     | 8  | 3,000 |                      |              |       |
| Bolivia 2010           | 17        | 3,018        | Suriname 2010    | 7  | 1,516 | <b>AVERAGE</b>       | <b>14.22</b> |       |

## Statistik deskriptif (mean) dari sepuluh variabel caleg petahana yang menang dan kalah pada 2014 (%)

|             | <i>Kedike-<br/>nalan</i> | <i>Kedisu-<br/>kaan</i> | <i>Kontak<br/>langsung</i> | <i>Ekspos<br/>via TV</i> | <i>Ekspos<br/>via<br/>Koran</i> | <i>Ekspos<br/>via Radio</i> | <i>Sosial<br/>Media</i> | <i>Media<br/>luar<br/>Ruang</i> | <i>Politik<br/>uang</i> | <i>Party<br/>ID</i> |
|-------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|
|             |                          |                         |                            | <i>Sukses</i>            |                                 |                             |                         |                                 |                         |                     |
| <b>Mean</b> | 20,27                    | 11,82                   | 2,15                       | 3,93                     | 2,14                            | 1,09                        | 0,78                    | 9,69                            | 46,93                   | 14.74               |
| <i>N</i>    | 220                      | 220                     | 219                        | 158                      | 160                             | 141                         | 198                     | 221                             | 182                     | 237                 |
| Std.Deviasi | 16,78                    | 11,27                   | 2,29                       | 6,52                     | 2,89                            | 1,6                         | 1                       | 8,5                             | 11,93                   | 5.16                |
|             |                          |                         |                            | <i>Kalah</i>             |                                 |                             |                         |                                 |                         |                     |
| <b>Mean</b> | 12,25                    | 6,35                    | 1                          | 1,91                     | 1,41                            | 0,6                         | 0,48                    | 5,46                            | 43,87                   | 13.99               |
| <i>N</i>    | 220                      | 220                     | 208                        | 158                      | 148                             | 131                         | 176                     | 222                             | 200                     | 249                 |
| Std.Deviasi | 10,33                    | 5,92                    | 1,07                       | 3,71                     | 1,87                            | 0,63                        | 0,59                    | 5,62                            | 10,25                   | 4.53                |

# Analisis multivariat faktor penentu kemenangan dan kekalahan petahana

*Variabel dependen caleg petahana pemenang (atau kalah) dalam Pemilu 2014,  
0 = Kalah; 1 = Menang*

|                     | PKB       | PKS       | PDI-P     | Golkar    | Gerindra  | Demokrat  | PAN       | PPP       | Hanura    |
|---------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| <b>Kedikenalan</b>  | 0,045***  | 0,047***  | 0,045***  | 0,045***  | 0,044***  | 0,045***  | 0,045***  | 0,045***  | 0,044***  |
|                     | (0,012)   | (0,013)   | (0,012)   | (0,012)   | (0,012)   | (0,012)   | (0,012)   | (0,012)   | (0,012)   |
| <b>Politik uang</b> | 0,023**   | 0,026**   | 0,024**   | 0,025**   | 0,025**   | 0,021*    | 0,025**   | 0,024**   | 0,025**   |
|                     | (0,011)   | (0,011)   | (0,011)   | (0,011)   | (0,011)   | (0,011)   | (0,011)   | (0,011)   | (0,011)   |
| <b>Party ID</b>     | 0,017     | 0,019     | 0,009     | 0,016     | 0,016     | 0,016     | 0,016     | 0,014     | 0,016     |
|                     | (0,035)   | (0,035)   | (0,035)   | (0,035)   | (0,035)   | (0,035)   | (0,035)   | (0,035)   | (0,035)   |
| <b>Nomor urut</b>   | -0,487*** | -0,483*** | -0,516*** | -0,491*** | -0,491*** | -0,434*** | -0,493*** | -0,475*** | -0,490*** |
|                     | (0,119)   | (0,117)   | (0,123)   | (0,118)   | (0,118)   | (0,121)   | (0,118)   | (0,116)   | (0,118)   |
| <b>Dapil sama</b>   | -0,564    | -0,730    | -0,795    | -0,635    | -0,680    | -0,644    | -0,726    | -0,702    | -0,684    |
|                     | (0,850)   | (0,863)   | (0,869)   | (0,857)   | (0,853)   | (0,908)   | (0,871)   | (0,850)   | (0,853)   |
| <b>District</b>     | 0,135*    | 0,143*    | 0,128*    | 0,133*    | 0,137*    | 0,137*    | 0,135*    | 0,141*    | 0,134*    |
|                     | (0,075)   | (0,076)   | (0,076)   | (0,075)   | (0,075)   | (0,078)   | (0,075)   | (0,075)   | (0,076)   |
| <b>Laki-laki</b>    | 0,132     | 0,100     | 0,150     | 0,164     | 0,151     | -0,003    | 0,155     | 0,163     | 0,153     |
|                     | (0,310)   | (0,310)   | (0,312)   | (0,309)   | (0,309)   | (0,322)   | (0,309)   | (0,311)   | (0,308)   |
| <b>Asal partai</b>  | 0,951*    | 0,590     | 0,779**   | -0,225    | -0,056    | -1,196*** | -0,112    | 0,881     | 0,120     |
|                     | (0,522)   | (0,360)   | (0,329)   | (0,320)   | (0,564)   | (0,286)   | (0,471)   | (0,553)   | (0,874)   |
| <b>Konstanta</b>    | -1,734    | -1,817    | -1,456    | -1,648    | -1,656    | -1,212    | -1,607    | -1,722    | -1,648    |
|                     | (1,310)   | (1,316)   | (1,332)   | (1,311)   | (1,309)   | (1,369)   | (1,321)   | (1,308)   | (1,310)   |
| <b>Adjusted R2</b>  | 0,150     | 0,148     | 0,155     | 0,142     | 0,141     | 0,187     | 0,141     | 0,148     | 0,141     |

# Open-list PR shapes candidates' strategies



- Indonesia's adoption of an open-list system shapes candidates in three ways:
- (1) forced to compete against internal competitors for personal votes
- (2) rely on personal networks rather than the party;
- (3) only need to win a small slice of the voters to defeat co-partisans.

---

# Personal-loyalist strategy

- Accordingly, candidates need to campaign **strategically**.
- They first **prioritise** areas that have traditionally been viewed as their party strongholds which they think would be most likely to support them **personally**.
- Given party captives are limited and highly contested, candidates determine 'base voters' not only on the basis of past voting record, but also on **personal connections which refer to a candidate's birth place, kinship, ethnic and religious networks, or simply in terms of receipt of past patronage**.
- Candidates cannot solely rely on their personalised bases, but also need to reach a greater share of the electorate and direct benefits through informal **brokerage networks**.

# How effective is vote buying?



- If vote buying is so misdirected and susceptible to broker predation, **why** do candidates **invest so** heavily in it?
- If such exchange is truly inefficient, how can this **have an impact** on electoral outcomes?
- The effect of vote buying on voting behaviour is **two-fold**:
  - (1) whether cash handouts are effective at producing **higher turnout**
  - (2) whether they are effective at influencing **vote choice**.

# Vote buying results in greater turnout

Cross-tabulation of a respondent's reported turnout and their likelihood of being offered vote buying

|   |     | Did you vote during the 2014 election? |      | Total |
|---|-----|--|------|-------|
|   |     | No                                     | Yes  |       |
| Receiving offers of vote buying in the 2014 legislative elections | No  | 26.0                                   | 74.0 | 100   |
|   | Yes | 19.0                                   | 81.0 | 100   |
| Total   |     | 24.3                                   | 75.7 | 100   |

Pearson Chi-Square  
(Value/df/significance)

5.675/1/0.017


# Vote buying effect on vote choice



- My obtrusive measure: offers of vote buying influenced the vote choice of an estimated **10.2 percent** of total respondents.
- Likewise, receiving money during subnational executive elections only had an electoral effect on **11.1 percent** of the voters.

# What purpose does vote buying serve?


- At first glance, all estimates regarding the effect of vote buying may **appear small**.
- Despite the effect of vote buying looking insignificant, a minor shift in vote shares can **make a difference** between winning and losing in competitive elections.



## The average margin of victory by political party (%)

| Political Parties | Average Margin of Victory in Each Political Party | Average Number of Valid Votes Per Electoral District | Percentage |
|-------------------|---|--|------------|
| NASDEM            | 35516.7   | 1584462.9  | 2.24       |
| PKB               | 30180.2   | 1584462.9  | 1.90       |
| PKS               | 28500.4   | 1584462.9  | 1.80       |
| PDI-P             | 23080.2   | 1584462.9  | 1.46       |
| GOLKAR            | 23387.1   | 1584462.9  | 1.48       |
| GERINDRA          | 25530.5   | 1584462.9  | 1.61       |
| DEMOCRATIC PARTY  | 22124.9   | 1584462.9  | 1.40       |
| PAN               | 39263.1   | 1584462.9  | 2.48       |
| PPP               | 35049.7   | 1584462.9  | 2.21       |
| HANURA            | 23247.6   | 1584462.9  | 1.47       |


# Correlations between competitiveness & vote buying *within* electoral districts (%)




|             | Vote Buying |             |       |
|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------|
|             | N           | Correlation | Sign. |
| Vote Margin | 92          | -.218*      | 0.036 |

# Reported acceptance of vote buying, 2006 – 2024 (%)

As an effort to win the election (legislative, local executive, and presidential elections), certain candidates or brokers typically give money or gifts for people to influence their vote. In your opinion, can the money/gift be considered acceptable or unacceptable? ... (%)




# Vote Buying is Acceptable in Pre- and Post-Reform



Source: Muhtadi 2024

# Trendline Plot of Vote Buying Acceptability: Before April 2019 Vs After April 2019




Source: Muhtadi 2024

# The Relationship of Concurrent Elections and the Acceptability of Vote Buying

| Dependent: Vote Buying is Acceptable |                 |                 |                   |                 |                  |                  |                   |                  |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
|                                      | Province        | Regent/<br>City | National<br>Dapil | All             | Province         | Regent/<br>City  | National<br>Dapil | All              |
| Reform (April19)                     | .122<br>(0.000) | .138<br>(0.000) | .148<br>(0.000)   | .147<br>(0.000) | .141<br>(0.000)  | .181<br>(0.000)  | .144<br>(0.000)   | .169<br>(0.000)  |
| Age                                  |                 |                 |                   |                 | -.001<br>(0.000) | -.001<br>(0.000) | -.002<br>(0.000)  | -.002<br>(0.000) |
| Male                                 |                 |                 |                   |                 | -.006<br>(0.000) | -.014<br>(0.000) | -.011<br>(0.000)  | -.011<br>(0.000) |
| Urban                                |                 |                 |                   |                 | -.021<br>(0.000) | -.010<br>(0.000) | .015<br>(0.000)   | -.006<br>(0.000) |
| Islam                                |                 |                 |                   |                 | .051<br>(0.000)  | .054<br>(0.000)  | .118<br>(0.000)   | .075<br>(0.000)  |
| Jawa                                 |                 |                 |                   |                 | .132<br>(0.000)  | .107<br>(0.000)  | .080<br>(0.000)   | .100<br>(0.000)  |
| Education                            |                 |                 |                   |                 | -.022<br>(0.000) | -.025<br>(0.000) | -.027<br>(0.000)  | -.024<br>(0.000) |
| Observations                         | 466,486         | 629,043         | 438,523           | 1,534,052       | 461,518          | 622,573          | 437,446           | 1,521,538        |
| R-square                             | .016            | .016            | .016              | .023            | .049             | .045             | .041              | .050             |
| Adj. R-square                        | .016            | .016            | .016              | .023            | .049             | .045             | .041              | .050             |

# Effectiveness of Vote Buying, 2006-2024

If acceptable, will you accept that money or gift? ... (%)




Source: Muhtadi 2024

# The Link between Concurrent Elections and the Effectiveness of Vote Buying

| Dependent: The Effect of Vote Buying on Voting Behavior |                 |                 |                   |                 |                  |                  |                   |                  |
|---|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
|   | Province        | Regent/<br>City | National<br>Dapil | All             | Province         | Regent/<br>City  | National<br>Dapil | All              |
| Reform (April19)  | .092<br>(0.000) | .116<br>(0.000) | .390<br>(0.000)   | .161<br>(0.000) | .129<br>(0.000)  | .154<br>(0.000)  | .412<br>(0.000)   | .195<br>(0.000)  |
| Age   |                 |                 |                   |                 | -.009<br>(0.001) | .001<br>(0.000)  | -.001<br>(0.000)  | -.001<br>(0.000) |
| Male  |                 |                 |                   |                 | -.037<br>(0.000) | -.053<br>(0.000) | -.043<br>(0.000)  | -.044<br>(0.000) |
| Urban   |                 |                 |                   |                 | -.080<br>(0.000) | -.068<br>(0.000) | -.075<br>(0.000)  | -.082<br>(0.000) |
| Islam   |                 |                 |                   |                 | -.024<br>(0.000) | .027<br>(0.000)  | .047<br>(0.000)   | -.006<br>(0.012) |
| Jawa  |                 |                 |                   |                 | .033<br>(0.000)  | .064<br>(0.000)  | -.032<br>(0.000)  | .062<br>(0.000)  |
| Education   |                 |                 |                   |                 | -.034<br>(0.000) | -.038<br>(0.000) | -.040<br>(0.000)  | -.039<br>(0.000) |
| Observations  | 158,930         | 226,767         | 221,264           | 606,961         | 157,167          | 225,351          | 220,911           | 603,429          |
| R-square  | .007            | .010            | .073              | .020            | .038             | .056             | .103              | .058             |
| Adj. R-square   | .007            | .010            | .073              | .020            | .038             | .056             | .103              | .058             |

# The Price of a Vote Pre- and Post-Reform (Cumulative Percentage)

How much cash would a candidate need to give for you to find it appropriate to vote for him/her?



# Three Possible Explanations

- How do concurrent elections have a significant impact on vote buying?
- First, facilitate an increased occurrence of vote buying, which in turn leads to a higher level of acceptance of such practices. → The number of seats contested in the 2024 legislative elections was 20,462, national, provincial, and district legislative assemblies. 9,917 candidates ran for the 580 seats in the DPR, tens of thousands of candidates competed for 2,372 provincial DPRD seats, and hundreds of thousands of candidates competed for 17,510 district/city DPRD seats. 668 candidates also competed for the 136-seat Regional Representative Council (DPD). three presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the race.
- Second, adds high electoral uncertainty, especially in the open proportional system.
- Third, lack of monitoring and enforcing laws pertaining to rampant money politics, exacerbating the prevalence of vote buying and fostering social acceptance and a sense of impunity from the actors trapped in the vicious cycle of "everyone else is doing it."