Compared to the context of Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections, the context of the revision of the election law for the 2024-2029 period has received more support from the political and legal community. All provisions that usually cause legislation to drag on have been constitutionally resolved. The Constitutional Court has issued many final and binding decisions that address the need for improvements to Indonesia’s elections. This supportive situation (Mestakung) should be viewed positively by lawmakers.
Authority to Establish Electoral Districts
The first mestakung provision relates to the authority of the General Election Commission in establishing electoral districts. Constitutional Court Decision No. 80/PUU-XX/2022 marks an important shift towards a more impartial process in the structuring of electoral districts for the DPR and DPRD elections. By placing this authority with an independent election organizing body, the opportunity to uphold the principle of equal vote value (one person, one vote, one value) becomes greater. The determination of seat allocation per electoral district, the balance of representation between Java and outside Java, and the proportionality of population size are now normatively more likely to be guaranteed through technocratic mechanisms than through political compromise in parliament.
Prior to this ruling, the House of Representatives, through an appendix to the law, held full authority to form electoral districts for the DPR and even provincial DPRD. This design has long been criticized for opening up opportunities for conflicts of interest. Politicians and party factions in the DPR have the potential to maintain or change electoral district boundaries based on electoral motives and power calculations, rather than solely on the need for fair representation. In electoral literature, such conditions are often associated with partisan redistricting practices or even gerrymandering, which risks reducing the quality of electoral competition.
The transfer of authority to the General Elections Commission (KPU) through the Constitutional Court’s ruling should therefore be seen as an effort to strengthen the integrity of Indonesia’s electoral system. However, formal independence alone is not enough. Transparency of methodology, meaningful public participation, and strong oversight mechanisms remain prerequisites for ensuring that the formation of electoral districts is truly accountable and free from political intervention. Without these safeguards, the potential for bias remains, even though authority has been transferred from political actors to the election organizing body.
Parliamentary Threshold
The Constitutional Court’s ruling on the parliamentary threshold also has the potential to accelerate the revision of the Election Law. Ruling 116/PUU-XXI/2023 closes the debate that has been a source of political deadlock. The parliamentary threshold provision has often triggered a tug-of-war between large parties that want to maintain or raise the threshold for the sake of simplifying the party system, and small parties that feel disadvantaged and are pushing for the threshold to be abolished or lowered. With the Constitutional Court’s decision to overturn this provision, the most sensitive issue in the revision discussion has been automatically resolved at the constitutional level, so that it is no longer a subject of protracted political negotiations.
This condition makes the legislative process simpler and more focused. The DPR and the government no longer need to debate the threshold figure or compromise schemes that are often laden with electoral interests. Because the Constitutional Court’s decision is final and binding, lawmakers only need to adjust the technical norms related to seat allocation, the method of converting votes into seats, and the design of the party system without being burdened by political calculations of the threshold amount. With the elimination of this crucial issue, political time and energy can be focused on improving other aspects of election governance.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court’s removal of the parliamentary threshold also created legal certainty that encouraged the acceleration of regulatory harmonization. Without provisions influenced by the preferences of large or small parties, the revision of the Election Law became more based on the principles of representation and electoral justice, rather than merely a compromise between political forces. In this context, the Constitutional Court’s decision serves as a catalyst that reduces conflicts of interest and paves the way for faster, more efficient, and more substantial discussions on the revision of the law.
Candidacy Threshold
The next Mestakung provision that could accelerate and improve the revision of the election law is the provision to remove the nomination threshold for presidents and regional heads. This provision, based on Constitutional Court Decisions No. 62/PUU-XXII/2024 and 60/PUU-XXII/2024, could eliminate the most crucial source of tension between political parties. Until now, discussions on revising the Election Law have often been hampered by sharp differences between large parties, which tend to maintain high thresholds, and small parties, which push for the elimination or reduction of these requirements. With the Constitutional Court having overturned this provision, the space for political compromise on the issue of thresholds has been closed, so that discussions on revisions are no longer held hostage to protracted debates.
With no longer any option to maintain or change the threshold figure, lawmakers no longer need to allocate political energy to negotiations that tend to be transactional. The Constitutional Court’s final and binding decision has resolved the issue constitutionally. As a result, the focus of the revision can be directed at technical aspects and other system adjustments, such as the nomination mechanism, the schedule of stages, and the strengthening of election governance. This situation has the potential to accelerate the legislative process because one of the most controversial issues has been decided outside the political forum.
In addition, the elimination of debate regarding thresholds can also create certainty in policy direction. The House of Representatives and the government are no longer faced with the political dilemma of maintaining the dominance of large parties or accommodating the aspirations of small parties. With the basic framework already determined by the Constitutional Court, discussions on revising the Election Law have become more technocratic and administrative, rather than ideological or narrowly focused on specific interests. In this context, the Constitutional Court’s decision actually serves to “simplify the conflict,” paving the way for a more efficient and focused acceleration of the revision of the law.
Separation of National and Regional Simultaneous Elections
Another provision of Mestakung concerns the separation between national and regional simultaneous elections. This provision, based on Constitutional Court Decision No. 135/PUU-XXII/2024, ends the fundamental debate on the design of simultaneous elections. Until now, differences in opinion between those who wanted to maintain the five-box model and those who pushed for the separation of stages have often been an obstacle in discussions on revising the law. With the final and binding decision of the Constitutional Court, the direction of the election design has been determined constitutionally, thereby closing the door on political tug-of-war over the format of simultaneous elections.
This situation simplified the legislative agenda because lawmakers were no longer preoccupied with conceptual debates about the electoral model. The DPR and the government simply followed up on the Constitutional Court’s decision by formulating technical arrangements related to the schedule, stages, and adjustments to the terms of office affected by the separation of national and regional elections. Without the option of returning to the old model or maintaining the previous design, the revision discussion process became more focused on implementation and administrative aspects, rather than on short-term political interests.
In addition, Constitutional Court Decision 135 also created certainty regarding the direction of electoral system reform, which could accelerate the harmonization of other related regulations, such as laws on regional elections and regional government. With the overall design already established, the debate has become more technocratic and based on the effectiveness of implementation and the quality of democracy, rather than on the electoral gains of each political force. In this context, the ruling serves as a deadlock breaker that opens up space for a more structured and efficient acceleration of the revision of the Election Law.
Accelerating Revision
The final provision of Mestakung concerns accelerating the revision of the election law, which is also included in Constitutional Court Decision 135/PUU-XXII/2024. Unfortunately, the House of Representatives and the government are reluctant to accelerate discussions. The status of the Election Bill as a priority law for 2025 has not yet been realized. What is happening is not the DPR’s readiness, but prolonged uncertainty. Our politics are on the verge of major change, but election rules are being allowed to continue with the old logic.
If the revision of the Election Law is postponed again, we will enter the next election with a system that is worn out, fragile, and no longer meets the demands of the times. At that point, the burden of the election integrity crisis can no longer be shifted to the organizers or voters. The root of the problem is clear: a lack of political courage.
If this is the case, what makes revising the Election Law so difficult? The answer is simple but political: changing the rules will alter the map of interests. Therefore, some actors in the House of Representatives prefer to delay, minimize, or limit the revision to minor issues. Meanwhile, the public needs structural reform, not cosmetic fixes.
The momentum for revision is actually wide open. In recent years, civil society, election organizers, academics, and many observers have put forward solid recommendations. This is because all political, technical, and social indicators point to an urgent need to update the law. Democracy does not collapse solely because of external threats. It slowly weakens when political actors are reluctant to improve rules that are no longer relevant. All that remains is political will: is the House of Representatives willing to put the public interest above short-term electoral calculations?
It is time for Mestakung to work. The public must encourage, monitor, and demand that the House of Representatives and the government open up the revision process in a transparent, substantive, and inclusive manner. If this momentum is wasted again, Indonesian democracy will continue to operate under old rules in a new world. Instead of improving, Indonesian democracy will continue to decline. []
USEP HASAN SADIKIN
Researcher at the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem)