The discourse on increasing financial assistance for political parties (banpol) continues to be advocated by political parties. In principle, increasing banpol is not a wrong idea. In modern political financing theory, public funding for parties is actually seen as an instrument to reduce dependence on private sources of funding, which have the potential to give rise to clientelistic relationships and conflicts of interest. The state, in this perspective, is present to ensure that parties are able to carry out their functions of representation, cadre development, and political education without financial pressures that encourage transactional practices.
However, the fundamental issue is not whether or not banpol should be increased. The crucial question is: is the party accountability and integrity system strong enough to support this increase in public funding?
The latest data shows that the foundations of party governance are not yet fully solid. The results of the 2025 Political Party Integrity Index (IIPP) measurement conducted by the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN) on eight political parties in parliament placed the national achievement at an average score of 61.22 out of 100, in the “Moderate Integrity” category. Four dimensions—Code of Ethics (66.0), Internal Democracy (63.2), Cadre Development (61.4), and Recruitment (60.8)—remain at a moderate level. However, one crucial dimension, namely Transparent and Accountable Party Finances, only scored 44.5 and falls into the “Lacking Integrity” category.
This finding should be read as a warning. In the context of public funds, the financial dimension is the heart of accountability. If this aspect remains weak, then adding political funding without systemic reform risks exacerbating governance problems rather than solving them.
An evaluation of the practices of political funding use and reporting reveals structural problems in the system’s design. Normatively, banpol is divided between political education and secretariat operations, with political education being the priority. Previously, there was a clear 60:40 ratio, but now the regulations only standardize “priority” without any figures, performance indicators, or uniform quantitative standards. As a result, the room for interpretation has widened and measurement certainty has weakened.
At the implementation level, differences in party institutional capacity also determine the quality of reporting. Not all treasurers or financial managers have accounting skills or experience in managing public funds. The reporting process also tends to be ex-post—prepared towards the end of the fiscal year—so that administrative errors accumulate and are difficult to correct in a limited time. On the other hand, the Ministry of Home Affairs/Kesbangpol’s coaching and administrative assistance functions prior to the audit have not been effective. As a result, reports that are not yet fully complete are still forwarded to the audit stage, causing the BPK to be preoccupied with technical corrections that should have been completed in the previous phase.
Another recurring problem is the absence of national standards for the classification of political party accounts (categories in reporting), as well as the lack of uniform evidence guidelines (evidence rulebook). When the boundaries are unclear, differences in interpretation between parties and auditors are inevitable. In such situations, accountability tends to be understood as procedural compliance rather than substantive transparency.
Therefore, if the increase in banpol is to be realized, governance reforms must be carried out simultaneously. One of the urgent breakthroughs is the development of an E-Banpol system based on real-time recording and automatic validation. This system must ensure that every transaction is recorded when it occurs, classified according to a uniform national nomenclature, and accompanied by a minimum evidence package before it can be finalized.
Furthermore, transparency needs to be designed in a gradual and proportional manner. Information such as total funds received, absorption rate, and proportion of use can be disclosed during the current year. Audit results and follow-up progress are disclosed after the audit report is published. This tiered transparency model maintains a balance between public information disclosure and audit prudence.
However, system reform is not enough. The increase in banpol needs to be integrated with integrity-based incentive mechanisms. This is where the relevance of IIPP becomes strategic. The IIPP score should not stop at being a ranking tool, but should become the basis for fiscal policy. Parties with high integrity scores can receive an additional percentage of banpol as an incentive. Parties with moderate scores receive a basic allocation. Meanwhile, parties with low scores are required to improve their governance before receiving banpol.
This approach shifts the distribution of political funding from being based solely on seats to institutionalizing organizations with integrity. IIPP-based incentives will encourage parties to develop orderly financial systems, strengthen internal oversight, and increase transparency. Therefore, the increase in political funding should not stop at the nominal figure. With a financial dimension score of 44.5, which is still classified as lacking integrity, additional funding without reform will only become a fiscal burden without any democratic impact. Conversely, if accompanied by standardization, integrated digitalization, gradual transparency, and incentive schemes, every rupiah of political funding can become an investment in democratic integrity. An increase may occur, but integrity must increase simultaneously.
Annisa Alfath
Researcher at the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem)