Indonesia is affirmed as the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in the 1945 Constitution. Unitary means that sovereignty is not divided, but it does not mean that all affairs must be centralized. The 1945 Constitution actually opens up space for the division of government administration through the regulation of regional government. Therefore, the design of regional head elections needs to be consistent with the way the constitution regulates the distribution of power.
At the same time, the amendments clarify the presidential character by placing the president as the holder of governmental power according to the Constitution. In presidentialism, the executive gains political legitimacy from the voters, not from parliamentary appointment. Classical literature asserts that presidentialism works through an executive mandate that is separate from the legislative mandate, so that the executive’s primary accountability is to the people through elections (Linz, 1990). This principle is important because it determines where the executive “looks” when making decisions: to the voters or to the legislative elite.
At this point, the debate over the “high cost of direct regional elections” often jumps too quickly to procedural solutions. Ramlan Surbakti reminds us that the mechanism for electing regional heads follows the structure of the state as established by the constitution, including the form of government and the model of regional government. This means that the example of a parliamentary state that elects regional heads through local councils cannot be used as an automatic justification for Indonesia, which is a presidential state (Surbakti, 2025). Cost is an important variable, but it is not the sole determining factor in the design of executive legitimacy.
If presidential logic is applied at the regional level, it makes sense to view regional heads as local executives who need a basis of public legitimacy. Indirect elections have the potential to shift the center of gravity of accountability from citizens to negotiations for support in the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD). This change not only alters the “way of electing,” but also changes the work incentives of regional executives in their relationship with the regional legislature. In a presidential design, such changes should be rigorously tested, as they can blur the lines of accountability that should be clear.
Clarifying the Source of Regional Heads’ Mandate
This coherence is further strengthened when decentralization and regional autonomy are positioned as constitutional consequences. The 1945 Constitution states that regional governments shall exercise the widest possible autonomy, except for matters designated as central government affairs (1945 Constitution, Article 18 paragraph (5)). This norm signifies that regions do not merely carry out instructions, but also administer government affairs that directly impact citizens. When regional decisions affect basic services, spatial planning, the business climate, and quality of life, it is only natural that the mandate of regional heads should come from the citizens who feel the impact.
The central-regional relationship is also regulated with attention to diversity. Article 18A paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution mandates that the relationship between central and regional authorities be regulated by law, taking into account the specificity and diversity of the regions. This means that regional variations are recognized, but must remain under democratic control that is accessible to citizens. Direct elections provide a simple mechanism for such control: citizens vote, evaluate, and then give electoral rewards or punishments.
The 1945 Constitution, Article 18B paragraph (1) also recognizes regional government units that are special or unique in nature. This norm shows that the constitution is not averse to differentiation, but requires that it be regulated through legislation. The implication is that major changes to the mechanism of legitimacy of regional heads must be assessed in terms of their impact on public acceptance and the stability of regional governance. The measure is not merely short-term efficiency, but rather the clarity of the mandate and the quality of accountability.
Within this framework, the issue of costs should be placed on the agenda of governance and political cost reform, not as a reason to shift the source of the mandate. Direct regional elections can still be evaluated, simplified, and made more efficient, without obscuring the accountability of regional heads to citizens. Healthy debate should distinguish between “problems of implementation” and “principles of legitimacy.”
Brief Comparison
The comparison is not intended as a prescription, but rather as a reminder of institutional patterns. In some presidential unitary states, local executive elections are still conducted directly by voters to keep the local executive mandate consistent with the logic of the national executive mandate (OECD & UCLG—SNG-WOFI, 2022). The Philippines is classified as a unitary state with a presidential regime that holds national and local elections (IFES, 2013). South Korea is also mapped as a unitary state, and the NEC lists local elections for governors, mayors, and local government heads in simultaneous local elections (UCLG, 2008).
Chile and Colombia provide similar illustrations. Chile is understood as a unitary state with a strong presidential tradition that also holds local elections for governors and mayors through direct elections (UCLG, 2008). Colombia is also mapped as a presidential unitary state, with direct elections for local executive positions as part of its subnational democratic design (SNG-WOFI, n.d.).
The main lesson is not the claim that direct elections are always cheap or expensive. The lesson is that the separation of executive and legislative mandates at the local level is commonly found in unitary states that choose presidentialism and design decentralization. If Indonesia moves regional elections to indirect elections, this change will shift the relationship of the regional executive to be more dependent on the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD). At that point, an honest debate must address the institutional consequences for autonomy, central-regional relations, and the accountability of regional heads to citizens, not merely rhetoric about savings. []
ANNISA ALFATH
Researcher at the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem)