Revisions to the Election Law (UU Pemilu) have become a routine five-yearly agenda item following the holding of elections. Of the six elections that have taken place since reformasi, there have been five different Election Laws governing the contest for representative seats in Indonesia. Electoral reform has become one of the “jargon” or terminology that often appears in every discussion of revisions to the Election Law. The question is, what is meant by electoral reform? How does electoral reform work? This article aims to answer these two questions.
Electoral reform has various meanings and definitions. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) defines electoral reform as efforts to change the rules, procedures, or institutions that govern the electoral process. Reynolds (et.al 2005) specifically views electoral reform as a process of modifying the electoral system to achieve certain political goals such as inclusiveness, government stability, or conflict reduction. Meanwhile, Norris (2011) sees the goal of electoral reform as improving the quality of representation or political stability, and Lijphart sees it as an effort to maintain proportionality and fair representation.
From this explanation, electoral reform is closely related to the process of changing the design of the electoral system to achieve certain objectives. In the Indonesian context, the debate on electoral reform has always been dichotomized into two objectives, namely: increasing the degree of representativeness and governability. The degree of representativeness is measured by the level of proportionality of the election results, while governability is seen in terms of the extent to which the electoral system is able to provide incentives for simplifying the party system.
Both of these objectives can be achieved by changing or modifying the electoral system. This is because the electoral system consists of a set of technical variables that serve to convert voters’ votes into representative seats. Reynolds (et.al 2005) divides electoral system variables into three categories. First, the electoral formula, whether the electoral system is plurality/majority, proportional, or a mixed system, including the mathematical formula used to calculate seat allocation.
In a plurality/majority electoral system, a mathematical formula is used to allocate seats based on the principle of “the winner takes all.” Meanwhile, in a proportional electoral system, there are two mathematical formula models: largest remainder with the Hare and Droop variants, and highest average with the Sainte Lague and D’Hondt variants, to calculate votes into seats. The mathematical formulas of quota hare and Sainte Lague tend to prioritize proportionality between the votes obtained and the seats held by parties (Loosmore & Hanny 1971). Meanwhile, the droop and d’hondt variants tend to favor large parties (Gallagher & Mitchel 2005).
Second, the structure of voting is related to the design of the ballot and the voting method used by voters. Do voters cast their votes for candidates, parties, or preferentially by ranking the list of candidates on the ballot? There are two types of proportional electoral systems: closed proportional electoral systems, where the ballot paper only lists party logos, and open proportional electoral systems, where the ballot paper lists candidates.
Third, district magnitude, or the number of representatives allocated to an administrative region, which is then known as an electoral district. District magnitude greatly depends on the choice of electoral system design. If a plurality-majority electoral system is used, there will only be one seat allocated to each electoral district, or single-member district. However, if a proportional electoral system is used, there will be more than one seat allocated to each electoral district, or multi-member district. Duverger’s law (1954) explains that there is a mechanical effect caused by variations in district magnitude on the party system with the proposition that “single member districts produce a two-party system while multi-member districts produce a multi-party system.”
Apart from these three categories, there are several other variables that have a direct or indirect influence on the conversion of votes to seats, namely the parliamentary threshold and the timing of elections. The parliamentary threshold is the minimum number of votes required to obtain a representative seat. The size of the parliamentary threshold has a direct impact on the proportionality of election results. The higher the parliamentary threshold, the more difficult it is for parties to obtain seats and the higher the number of wasted votes.
The election schedule is an indirect variable of the electoral system that affects the conversion of votes to seats. In a multiparty presidential system, congruent elections for the executive and legislative branches at the same time can provide incentives for the effectiveness of the system of government due to the coattail effect of the integration between voter choices in presidential and legislative elections, so that the elected president gains majority support in parliament (Samuels 2003).
From this, it appears that the choices of electoral system variables can be directed to achieve the objectives of proportionality in election results or political stability in government. However, these two objectives are often seen as mutually exclusive, as if it were impossible to achieve both. This situation is inseparable from the motivation behind electoral reform, which often ignores objective conditions because the choices of electoral system design are not merely a matter of experts providing the “right answer,” but rather prioritize electoral gains as the sole primary motivation. []
HEROIK M. PRATAMA
Executive Director of the Association for Elections and Democracy (Perludem)